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O conceito de parcerias público - privadas tem chamado a atenção dos economistas e Governos 
nas últimas décadas, onde sucessos e fracassos coexistem em todo o Mundo na esperança de 
atingir o Value for Money. A definição, conceitos e os objectivos das parcerias público - 
privadas serão abordadas na generalidade da tese. A taxa de desconto que o sector público 
deverá adoptar numa parceria deste tipo é uma discussão global e a questão principal abordada 
nesta tese. Não será concluído se a parceria público - privada deveria ser ou não realizada. Há 
muitas perspectivas diferentes relativas às várias taxas de desconto a utilizar, mas, neste caso, 
apenas serão abordadas três taxas distintas e será construída e analisada uma estimativa relativa 
ao valor actual dos pagamentos futuros efectuados pelo Governo às empresas privadas que têm 






The concept of Public Private Partnerships has brought attention to the economists and Public 
Parties on the last few decades, where success and failure have occurred all over the world, 
where Governments search for the objective of Value for Money.  We will define what a Public 
Private Partnership is and what are their main goals and conceptions. What discount rate should 
the Public Sector adopt in a Public Private Partnership is a global discussion nowadays and the 
main issue on this paper. We will not consider if a Public Private Partnership should or should 
not be realized, on the other hand we will try to create some scenario basis for the Portuguese 
experience. There are many different approaches and in this paper we will take a look to three 
different approaches and develop an estimate through the future payments in the next 50 years 
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1) Introduction  
 
Governments in order to lead countries in the pursuit of economic wealth, deliver goods and 
services in different kinds of way. Since some decades ago, governments would produce and 
provide many trying goods and services, but nowadays there has been a continuous trend with 
governments trying to boost their value for money by using Public Private Partnerships as a 
solution to achieve it.  
In Europe there is a long experience with Public Private Partnerships, in sectors, such as, water, 
transportation, energy, education (schools and colleges), health services, etc.  
Portugal has an important experience that started under the construction of the giant Vasco da 
Gama Bridge in 1995. Portugal has Public Private Partnerships in the road sector, and has 
moved to sectors like water, subways and hospitals. 
In a Public Private Partnership, the government establishes a long-term contract with a partner 
from the private sector to deliver goods or a service. The private partner will be responsible for 
building, operating and maintaining assets that are necessary to deliver such goods or services. 
(OECD, 2008) 
The main discussion in this paper will focus on what discount rates should be applied in the 
discount of the future cash flows from the public sector perspective. Some work has been 
developed on this issue especially from Spackman, Grimsey, Shaoul and Grout. (2002-2005) 
We will try to use previous experiences of the discount flows methods and calculate discount 














2) A brief review of literature 
2.1) Important concepts 
 
Over the last few decades, governments from different countries have been developing new 
strategies regarding the use of Public-Private Partnerships.  
 
Public-Private Partnerships fill a gap between traditionally procured government projects and 
full privatization, with the government retaining ultimate responsibility over a Public-Private 
Partnership. (Grimsey and Lewis 2005) 
 
According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development there is currently 
no clear definition of what constitutes a Public-Private Partnership.  (OECD 2008)  
 
One definition can be found by Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development:  "a 
Public-Private Partnership is an agreement between the government and one or more private 
partners (which may include the operators and the financers) according to which the private 
partners deliver the service in such a manner that the service delivery objectives of the 
government are aligned with the profit objectives of the private partners and where the 
effectiveness of the alignment depends on a sufficient transfer of risk to the private partners." 
(OECD 2008) 
 
As for the International Monetary Fund definition is: "Public-Private Partnerships refer to 
arrangements where the private sector supplies infrastructure assets and services that 
traditionally have been provided by the government. In addition to private execution and 
financing of public investment, Public-Private Partnerships have two other important 
characteristics: there is an emphasis on service provision, as well as investment, by the private 
sector; and significant risk is transferred from the government to the private sector. Public-
Private Partnerships are involved in a wide range of social and economic infrastructure 
projects, but they are mainly used to build and operate hospitals, schools, prisons, roads, 
bridges and tunnels, light rail networks, air traffic control systems, and water sanitation 
plants." (IMF, 2006:1 and 2004:4, pg. 17) 
 
 




The mechanics of the arrangements can take many forms and may incorporate some or all of the 
following features (Pierson and McBride, 1996): 
 
 the public sector entity transfers land, property or facilities controlled by it to the private 
sector entity (with or without payment in return) usually for the term of the arrangement; 
 the private sector entity builds, extends or renovates a facility; 
 the public sector entity specifies the operating services of the facility; 
 services are provided by the private sector entity using the facility for a defined period 
of time (usually with restrictions on operations standards and pricing); and  
 the private sector entity agrees to transfer the facility to the public sector (with or 




2.2) Value For Money  
 
The main achievement of a Public-Private Partnership is Value for Money (Grimsey and Lewis, 
2005).   
According to Grimsey & Lewis, Value for Money can be summarized in six main determinants: 
Risk transfer, the long-term nature for contracts, the use of an output specification, competition, 
performance measurement, incentives and private sector management skills.  
The achievement of Value for Money, as can be seen as: "the optimum combination of whole 
life cost and quality to meet the user's requirements". (Grimsey and Lewis 2005)  
There are three specific requisitions that should be guaranteed.  Firstly, projects must be 
awarded in a competitive environment. Secondly, economic appraisal techniques, including 
proper appreciation of risk, must be rigorously applied, and that risk is allocated between the 
public and private sector so that the expected Value For Money is maximized. Thirdly, 
comparisons between traditionally procurement and privately financed options must be fair, 
realistic and comprehensive. (Grimsey, Lewis 2005) 
Usually a Public-Private Partnership project depends upon two financial criteria: Value for 
Money must be demonstrated and the scheme must be affordable to both the government and 
the purchasers. Both are central to the financial appraisal process. However, while Value for 
Money is substantiated with the use of discounted cash flow techniques, affordability is less 
clearly defined and operationalized as a decision role. (Shaoul, 2005)  
 





According to Shaoul (2005), a specific methodology of Value for Money has to be undertaken. 
It is the primary criterion. In the context of public finance, it is associated with the three Es, 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Value for Money is assumed to be measured using the 
concept of net present costs, a variant of the net present value technique. The financial costs of 
the whole life of the projects as financed under conventional procurement, known as the Public 
Sector Comparator, are discounted to yield a Net Present Cost, and compared against the Net 
Present Cost of the project as procured under a Public-Private Partnership. Following the Net 
Present Value rule whereby the investment with the highest Net Present Value is preferred 
because it maximizes wealth, the option with the lowest Net Present Cost is selecting as 
yielding the greatest financial benefit. It does consider that:  
 
1 - The suitability of discounted cash flow techniques in the context of public sector investment; 
2 - The choice of the discount rate;  
3 - The choice of the Public Sector Comparator; and  




2.3) Public Sector Comparator  
 
Public Sector Comparator is the calculation of the benchmark cost of providing the specified 
with the same output and quality defined for the private service under traditional procurement 
and, second, a comparison of this benchmark cost with the cost of providing the specified 
service under a Public-Private Partnership scheme. (Grimsey and Lewis 2005) 
According to Grimsey and Lewis four main alternatives can be discerned. Most complex to the 
least: 
 
1 - Full cost-benefit analysis of public and private alternatives (obtaining a Net Present Value); 
2 - Public Sector Comparator - Public-Private Partnership comparison before bids are invited;  
3 - UK Style Public Sector Comparator - Public-Private Partnership test after bids; and 
4 - Competitive bidding process to determine Value for Money once Public-Private Partnership 
"road testing" has been established. 
 




The calculation of the Public Sector Comparator promotes full costing at an early stage in 
project development; it provides a key management tool during the procurement process by 
focusing attention on the output specification, risk allocation and comprehensive costing. It also 
provides a means for testing Value for Money; it is a consistent benchmark and an evaluation 
tool. It can encourage competition by generating confidence in the market that financial rigor 
and probity principles are being applied. (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005) 
To be a proper and valid comparative model of traditional procurement, the Public Sector 
Comparator calculation must be prepared under the same assumptions as the Public-Private 
Partnership, in terms of: timing, funding, procurement costs, and output specification and 
performance standards. (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005) 
Regarding timing and funding respectively, Shaoul (2005) explains that it is assumed that the 
costs of public sector investment have to be met in the year in which they occur: in other words, 
the option for the public sector of spreading costs over time through financing is ignored. This is 
important because the discounting methodology favors options that defer expenditure over those 
which have high costs in early years, creating an artificial advantage for Public Finance 
Initiative options, where costs are spread over period of 20-35 years.   
 
In both UK and Australia, Public Sector Comparators are generally categorized into four core 
elements: 
- Raw Public Sector Comparator (base costs); 
- Transferable Risk (the optimal allocation of risk is the key objective of all Public-Private 
Partnerships and value transferable risk needs to be included in the Public Sector Comparator); 
- Retained risk; and 
- Competitive neutrality. 
 
Some criticism has been made about the Public Sector Comparator model approach, Grimsey & 
Lewis divided in four general concerns. Firstly, the Value for Money evaluation usually comes 
down to a choice between two Net Present Values. Public Sector Comparator is entirely 
hypothetical, and it is value can be altered by the assumptions made, especially about risk 
transfer to the private sector. Is by definition a rough estimate compared with a fully specified, 
fixed price Public-Private Partnership contract. (Shaoul, 2005) Secondly, the Discount rate 
methodology is faulty. It does not provide a measure of social time preference. Because of the 
discounting inherent in calculating Net Present Values, even small changes in the discount rate 
applied will vary the outcome as to which scheme is the best Value for Money. Thirdly, 
irrespective of how much risk is transferred to the private sector, the main risks are still held by 
the public sector and costs fall upon the general public. Further the real issue is uncertainty and 
not risk. Finally, in a longer term evaluation non-financial elements are given more emphasis.  





2.4) Risk Transfer 
 
This is an important concept of a Public-Private Partnership, but it will not be set in practice in 
this paper. According to Shaoul (2005), as well as the financial costs, the comparison includes 
the cost of the risks associated. There are some risks that are transferred to the private sector, the 
Public-Private Partnership should provide better Value for Money than if it was traditionally 
procured, and where the public sector would bear all the risks. Only until a specified level the 
more risk is transferred, the more expensive the Public Sector Comparator becomes relative to 




3) Questions about the Discount Rate 
 
The next and most important issue in this paper is the discount rate that will be used in the 
Value for Money test. In the preparation of the Public Sector Comparator, a financial model of 
the project is prepared and developed, in this model is included all the forecast of the future cash 
flows related to the project, assuming that it is carried out in the public sector. (Grimsey and 
Lewis, 2004) 
It is standard practice in private and public project or policy analysis to discount costs and 
benefits over time, usually at a constant percentage rate per year. (Spackman, 2008) 
Between the economics literature there is a broad agreement, firstly, for the use of discount rate 
that are lower than in the private sector, but in fact all of these assumptions lack of theoretical 
rigor, and secondly, there should always be chosen a series of discount rates to test the 
sensitivity of project outcomes and thirdly against the use of opportunity cost approaches. 
(Shaoul, 2005) 
What discount rate should be used is a global discussion among the academics and practioners, 
and the main discussion of this paper. Therefore, and according to Sarmento (2009), there are 
five main approaches: Social Rate of Time Preference; Social Opportunity Cost of Capital; a 
hybrid of the "social rate of time preference" and the "social opportunity cost of capital"; Equity 
Premium and Risk-free Interest Rate. 
 
 





3.1) Social Rate of Time Preference  
 
The discount rate should reflect government policy preferences, using a "social rate of time 
preferences".  
According to the Green Book (Grimsey, 2004), social time preference can be defined as the 
value society attaches to present, as opposed to future consumption. The social time preference 
rate is used for discounting future benefits and costs, and is based on comparisons of utility 
across different points in time or even different generations. It can be defined in two 
components:  
 
1. The rate at which individuals discount future consumption over present consumption, 
on the assumption that no change in per capita consumption is expected.  
 
2. There is an additional element, if per capita consumption is expected to grow over time, 
reflecting the fact that these circumstances imply that future consumption will be 
plentiful relative to the current position and thus have lower marginal utility.  
 
This effect is represented by the product of the annual growth in per capita consumption and the 
elasticity of marginal utility of consumption with respect to utility. With the first component 
estimated at 1.5% per annum, and the second at 2% per annum, the social time preference is 
valued at 3.5% per annum in real terms. (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004) 
According to Spackman (2008), Social Time Preference is normally defined as the time 
preference of the population as a whole for marginal income or consumption. The authors that 
have studied about the Social Time Preference as a discount rate for the public sector were 
Eckstein (1958) and Feldstein (1964) and later an influential paper by Bradford (1975). Others 
like Arrow and Kurz (1970) developed a powerful book. All these different authors adopted the 
principle that the social value of a public investment is the present value of all its impacts on 
consumption, discounted at the Social Time Preference rate for consumption. (Spackman, 2008) 
 
As the basis for deriving the rate of Social Time Preference this particular equation should be 
applied (1): 
 
(I) STP = δ + ηg (1) 
Where δ = pure time preference, per cent per year; 
η = income elasticity of the marginal utility of income (with sign reversed); 




and g = rate of growth of per capita income, per cent per year. 
 
The algebra is well set out by Feldstein (1965). The term δ - time preference for marginal utility 
- defines the extent to which the current population (or its government) cares about future 
marginal utility. The term ηg measures the extent to which the utility of a marginal dollar 
declines with increasing income. Note that the Social Time Preference rate can equally be 
applied to other monetary currencies, such as € (Euro), as long as all the quantities are expressed 
in, or converted to the same currency. (Spackman, 2008) 
According to Spackman (2008) valuation of δ and η is not straightforward. However there is a 
broad agreement in the literature to derive practical values for most developed countries. 
(Spackman, 2008) 
According to Arrow (1995) this approach is well known and was noted several times at the high 
powered United States workshop on long term discounting reported in Portney and Weyant 
(1999) - most clearly in the paper by Cline. Meanwhile there is some controversy about the 
value of δ and some extent the value of η, and on the extent to which conventional discounting, 
even with declining rates over time, is adequate for unknowns, over a very long term, such as, 
those associated with climate changes (Weitzman, 2008). 
 
Grimsey (2005), consider that the discount rate have two elements: 
First, Social Time Preference Rate, in the 2003 edition of the Green Book (HM Treasury, 2003) 
a discount rate of 3.5% in real terms was introduced, based on what it regards as social time 
preference (i.e. the pure time value of money from society's viewpoint).  
This change in the policy was described by the United Kingdom treasury: "Instead of reflecting 
risk in a risk premium on capital, Government investment decisions reflect risk by calculating 
the present value capital sum it regards as the necessary contingency for the risks inherent in a 
project. For example, when deciding between procurement options, project managers calculate 
an expected value of all risks for each option, and consider how exposed each option is to future 
uncertainty. They then discount the cost of these options in future years at 3.5% per year to a 
present value, which purely reflects society's preference for consumption now over consumption 
in the future, rather than discounting the value of project cash flows at a higher rate to make a 
compensation for risk.  Risks are therefore priced individually for each project option. The 
discounted costs of these risk-adjusted options can then be compared with each other, or with 
the cost of a PFI (same as Public-Private Partnership), in a PSC, to determine which 
procurement option represents Best Value for Money taking account of risk and uncertainty. 
This approach is consistent with the fact that in conventional procurement the public sector pays 
for risk not in its borrowing - which for the public sector is at non-risk rates - but when risks 
crystallize and must be covered in publicly funded projects."  (Treasury, 2003b, p.42)  





According to Shaoul (2005), it is interesting to note that when the Conservative United 
Kingdom government adopted the Social Time Preference general approach in 1982, it was 
assumed that the discount rate for use in the public sector investment appraisal should be a test 
rate of 5%, a rate that was higher than the 2-4% that was preferred by welfare economists, at a 
time when interest rate were at an all high. 
Second, there are some other factors, mainly to ensure that the public sector does not assess the 
benefit of projects without taking account of the risk to which it exposes taxpayers in the 
process (as an example, if things go wrong in a project additional costs may occur). (Sarmento, 
2009) 
According to Spackman (2002), the United Kingdom's Treasury's Guide on Appraisal and 
Evaluation (HM Treasury, 1997, Annex G) makes a distinction between the rate of social time 
preference and the cost of capital. It would probably be unmanageable for any government to 
administer different general rates for these two quantities. Spackman (2002) reinforces saying 
that it would be computationally complicated, and probably generate endless confusion.  
However, it is essential to distinguish between time preference and cost of public capital.  
According to Spackman (2008), Italy uses a theoretical basis of discount rate based on Social 




3.2) Social opportunity cost of capital  
 
Derivates from the first one, it is argued that the discount rate should reflect the "social 
opportunity cost of capital". 
According to the economics dictionary, social opportunity cost is "the opportunity cost to the 
society of making a certain good or service, at the expense of using the factor of production for 
a different good or service." (www.economics-dictionary.com) 
In 1991 UK's Greenbook changed their position on the discount rate. Firstly, it was argued that 
the marginal opportunity costs of capital, as well as, the Social Time Preference were really 
relevant to the investments decisions in the public sector. Secondly, both were higher than the 
government's cost of capital and thirdly they were for practical purposes equal. The United 
Kingdom's government was seeking for a single discount rate, mainly to achieve two different 
purposes. Firstly, it required the discount rate to equal the social opportunity cost of capital, and 
thus, in effect, settled on a rate identical to the then prevailing "pre-tax long term cost of capital 




for low risk purpose in the private sector". (Treasury, 1991, Annex G, para 2) According to 
Spackman (2002): "prevent any bias in favor of public sector financing". (Treasury, 1991, para 
49) Secondly, the discount rate was supposed to provide a measure of the Social Time 
Preference when comparing the net present costs of different ways of financing public sector 




3.3) - Is a hybrid of the "social rate of time preference" and the "social 
opportunity cost of capital" 
 
For most practical purposes, the appropriate cost of public capital is the sum of the tax-
exclusive real interest cost of government debt, it's a factor for 'systematic risk', because the 
quantum of tax paid on marginal returns to private sector capital. UK's Treasury guidance 
originally drafted when real interest rate were much higher than today's, it is suggested that this 
cost of capital is in the same range of plausibility as social time preference. (Spackman, 2002) 
Tax component estimation is very often complex.  
The Treasury's derivation of social time preference follows the mainstream welfare economics 
rationale for giving less weight to marginal consumption in the long-term rather than the short-
term. It is suggested that a normal range is 4-6% per year in real terms. Time preference is the 
appropriate discount rate for most government applications. (Spackman, 2002)  
However the adjustment for UK tax, combined with the adjustment for risk, cannot easily 
justify adding more than about 1 percentage point to the cost of indexed gilts, which in early 
2002 was 2-2.5%. (Spackman, 2002) 
According to Spackman (2008), he suggests the use of social opportunity cost / Social Time 
Preference weighted discount rate, and it is sometimes presented as obvious that the opportunity 
cost of public investment is measured by the commercial rate of return that would be earned on 
private investment. Meanwhile, there are some fundamental problems.  
A first issue is the fact that within the growth of international financial markets, public 
investment will not have a big impact on private investment. Lind (1990) concluded that, "the 
crowding out [of private investment by public investment] that has been the focus of most of the 
closed economy models does not appear to be very important to the analysis of the social 
discount rate". 




Secondly, there has to be a macroeconomic optimization, ensuring that taxation and borrowing 
are balanced. A competent government guarantees that the social costs of marginal taxation and 
of marginal borrowing are equal. (Spackman, 2008)  
Another weakness is the fact that the opportunity cost of public investment is not completely 
measured by a rate of return. In fact the true opportunity cost is the present value of the stream 
of consumption displaced by the tax (or borrowing) used to fund the public spending. 
(Spackman, 2008) 
Arrow (2000), responded to a two page argument by a Harvard professor for the use of a 10% 
Social opportunity cost rate in an article on climate change, he commented that "for these two 
reasons [tax and risk] the observed rate of return in the private sector is not the correct one for 
assessing public investment projects". 
Spackman (2008) refers that, the use of a Social opportunity cost rate, or a Social Opportunity 
Cost /Rate of Time Preference weighted rate, "has a strong intuitive appeal, which is easily sold 
to senior administrators or ministers, and it remains influential in many countries and 
international bodies, at least for presentational purposes. As an example, the United States 
Office of Management and Budget rate for comparing public investment with subsequent 
benefits in kind of 7% (OMB, 2003) is presented as a Social Opportunity Cost rate. On the other 
hand, UN (Economic Commission for Europe, 2003) and the World Bank (Birdsall and Steer, 
1993) also, for comparing public investment with subsequent benefits in kind, adopt Social 
Opportunity Cost or weighted rates. 
The EC (European Commission, 2008) recommend the use of a Social Opportunity Cost rate for 
financial analysis, but as noted above this is a required financial rate of return to public sector 




3.4) Equity Premium  
 
Is the "equity premium", it is defined as the return that is earned by a risky security in excess of 
what is earned in a risk free security. For our studies the discount rate should be the pre-tax 
government borrowing rates.   
According to Spackman (2002), the cost of senior debt to Public-Private Partnership projects is 
typically 2-3% points above the cost of government debt (including the cost of insurance to 
achieve AAA rating). The average equity premium is itself controversial. (Spackman, 1997) 
The perfect capital markets view is that equity premium has been over 5%. Spackman refers that 




the premium is much higher than the cost of systematic risk to publicly financed projects and it 




3.5) Risk-free interest rate  
 
This is the last approach, it uses the risk-free interest rate of the country depending on the 
maturity of the project.  
According to Damodaran, models of risk and return in finance start off with the simple 
presumption that there exists a risk free asset and that the expected return on that asset is known.   
 
Damodaran refers that they are two conditions to be a risk free rate:  
 
1 - There can be no risk default associated with its cash flows and 
2 - There can be no reinvestment risk  
 
It's important to refer that in the 1970s these approaches were followed by a financial market 
approach called Efficient Financial Markets. According to Spackman (2008), in a competitive 
market, equity risk premiums measure a cost of "systematic risk". It is the risk of volatility that 
is correlated with the equity market average volatility or, in other words, it cannot be diversified 
elsewhere. Economists believe that this premium measures an inherent social cost of the risk of 
the activity that will be financed.  And if the activity is financed by public debt it makes small 
or no difference: the cost of systematic risk that would be revealed by the equity premium, if it 
were privately financed, it is still there (Brealey et al, 1997, Grout, 2003) 
This approach implies that the appropriate discount rate for comparing its costs and/or benefits 
over time should be derived as it is in the private sector, with capital asset pricing model.  In the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model the cost of capital for an activity is the sum of the risk-free rate and 
a risk premium equal to the equity market average risk premium multiplied by a factor (beta) 








Grout (2003) refers that it's inappropriate to use similar discount rates for private and public 
provision in tests between public sector and Public-Private Partnerships. He emphasizes the use 
of lower discount rates in the public sector when comparing with the private sector.   
 
In “Exhibit 1 – Discount rates table” we have resumed the five approaches, where we divided in: 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4) Public Private Partnerships in Portugal 
 
4.1.) Brief review  
 
In Portugal Public Private Partnerships have started in 1995 with the Vasco da Gama Bridge, 
even before the creation of a specific legal framework. 
Only in 2003 there was created a legal framework (“Decreto – Lei nº 86/2003) that could 
coordinate all Public Private Partnerships contracts. Its aim was to apply to all sectors the 
coordination of conception, building, operation, and the award of Public Private Partnerships. 
This legal framework was revised and improved in a new legal framework (“Decreto – Lei 
nº141/2006) particularly with regard to effectiveness of sharing risks and benefits between both 
sides of the contracts (Public sector and private bidder). 
Public Private Partnerships are very common in Portugal, according to the DGTF (Direcção-
Geral do Tesouro e Finanças) the department of GASEPC (Gabinete de Acompanhamento do 
Sector Empresarial do Estado, Parcerias Público-Privadas e Concessões) had in 2010 more than 
120 ongoing projects. (DGTF, 2010) 
The road sector represents the largest portion of concessions, more or less 41% of all 
concessions (PPP's Relatório 2010). The new projects of 2009 involve in the road sector the 
construction of 414km of new highways and the maintenance of older ones. In the Health Sector 
there are new hospitals that will upgrade some important areas, and in the environment sector 
there are two new projects: Resinorte and Simdouro. 
  
4.1.1) Road Sector  
 
There are new investments on the road sector. According to “Entidades gestoras de Projectos” 
there has been a rise of 1.649M in 2010 over 2009 on these investments which represent 74% of 
the total new investments. This is followed by the health and environmental sector that account 
with 15% and 11%, respectively.  
In 2009 there have been some changes in the Portuguese legislation (Decreto – Lei nº110/2009), 
specifically about the concession policy with the Estradas de Portugal SA. This is the company 
that was granted the finance, conception, construction, conservation and development of the 
Portuguese highways. 
Under the new policy of concession, Estradas de Portugal has to evaluate customer satisfaction 
on the highway service and report its findings to the public sector. 




These highways were paid by the people who used them within a process of a virtual toll (scut) 
that was charged when the user was passing in a certain place. Nowadays, there has been a 
change of policy and the user pays the toll, in full. 
Today there are in operation eleven highways; seven are under the SCUT Program (SCUT 
highways are under virtual tolls, whose costs are (were) supported by the Portuguese 
Government) and the construction and maintenance is the responsibility of a utility company. In 
construction there are eight highways, four of them were signed in 2009 (Baixo Alentejo, Baixo 
Tejo, Litoral Oeste and Algarve Litoral). In contest there is only one (Pinhal Interior). 
 
4.1.2) Rail Road Sector   
 
Within the Public - Private Partnerships, it is important to refer that the project of a TGV of 
Lisbon-Porto and Lisbon-Madrid it has been discussed, but the new Prime Minister of Portugal 
says that it is cheaper to perhaps use TGV’s funds to improve the rail road’s that already exist, 
this option can be three to five times less expensive than the first option. 
In operation there is the Lisbon-Setubal rail road that uses the Bridge 25th April whose private 
partner is Fertagus the other project is a small Metro that was granted to the Metro Transportes 
do Sul. At the end of 2009 there were 2 projects being considered: PPP1 - Poceirão/Caia and 
PP2 Lisboa/Poceirão. 
 
4.1.3) Health Sector  
 
The Portuguese Government has invested in this area in the last few years, being one of their 
priorities to achieve a better national healthcare service by investing in new hospitals and 
revamping older ones.    
At the end of 2009 there were 4 new hospitals active: São Brás de Alportel, Centro de 
atendimento do SNS, Hospital de Cascais and Braga's Hospital. There are three new Public 
Private Partnerships in contest: Hospital de Vila Franca de Xira, Hospital Lisboa Oriental and 












Table 2 – Resume of all Projects in Portugal   
Sector Concession Dealer Year Deadline Investment
Transports Concessão Lusoponte Lusoponte,SA 1995 30 867,0
Transports Concessão Norte AENOR,SA 1999 36 879,2
Transports Concessão Oeste A-E Atlantico,SA 1999 30 453,5
Transports Concessão Brisa Brisa 2000 35 2.623,8
Transports Concessão Litoral Centro Brisal, SA 2004 30 550,7
Transports Concessão Scut da Beira Interior (IP2/IP6) ScutVias,SA 1999 30 628,3
Transports Concessão Scut da Costa de Prata (IC1/IP5) LusoScut Costa de Prata,SA 2000 30 320,7
Transports Concessão Scut do Algarve (IC4/IP1) EuroScut,SA 2000 30 228,5
Transports Concessão Scut Interior Norte (IP3) NorScut,SA 2000 30 504,1
Transports Concessão Scut das Beiras Litoral e Alta (IP5) LusoScut Beiras Litoral e Alta,SA 2001 30 718,4
Transports Concessão Scut Norte Litoral (IP9/IC1) EuroScut Norte,SA 2001 30 318,6
Transports Concessão Scut Grande Porto (IP4/IC24) LusoScut,SA 2002 30 492,5
Transports Concessão Grande Lisboa LusoLisboa,SA 2007 30 180,0
Transports Sub-concessão Douro Litoral AEDL,SA 2007 27 777,7
Transports Sub-concessão AE Transmontana A-E 21, SA 2008 30 535,9
Transports Sub-concessão Douro Interior Aenor Douro,SA 2008 30 641,7
Transports Sub-concessão Tunel do Marão A-E Marão,SA 2008 30 348,2
Transports Sub-concessão Baixo Alentejo SPER SA 2009 30 381,9
Transports Sub-concessão Baixo Tejo AEBT,SA 2009 30 270,1
Transports Sub-concessão Litoral Oeste AELO, SA 2009 30 443,6
Transports Sub-concessão Algarve Litoral Rotas do Algarve Litoral, SA 2009 30 165,1
Transports Gestão Sist.Identificação Eléctrónico SIEV - Sist. Id. Elect. de Veículos, SA 2009 25 n.a.
Transports Metro Sul Tejo (1) MTS,SA 2001 30 268,7
Transports Transp. Ferroviário  eixo-norte/sul (2) Fertagus,SA 1999 11 900,0
Health Gestão do Centro de Atendimento do SNS LCS,SA 2006 4 4,0
Health Gestão Centro Medicina Fisica Reabilitação Sul GP Saúde 2006 7 3,0
Health Gestão do H. Braga - Ent. Gestora do Edifício Escala Braga, Gestora do Edifício SA 2009 30 122,0
Health Gestão do H. Braga - Ent. Gestora Estabelecimento Escala Braga, Gestora do Estabelecimento SA 2009 10 11,3
Health Gestão H. Cascais-Ent. Gestora Estabelecimento HPP,SA 2008 10 16,0
Health Gestão H. Cascais - Ent. Gestora do Edifício TDHOSP,SA 2008 30 56,0
Health Gestão H. Loures-Ent. Gestora Estabelecimento SGHL - Soc. Gestora do Hospital de Loures SA 2009 10 29,3
Health Gestão H. Loures - Ent. Gestora do Edifício HL - Sociedade Gestora do Edifíco SA 2009 30 84,6
Environment Águas do Cávado Águas do Cávado, SA 1995 30 108,2
Environment Águas do Centro Alentejano Águas do Centro Alentejano, SA 2003 30 75,8
Environment Águas do Douro e Paiva Águas do Douro e Paiva, SA 1996 30 452,7
Environment Águas do Oeste Águas do Oeste, SA 2001 30 294,8
Environment Águas de Santo André Águas de Santo André, SA 2001 30 130,3
Environment Águas de Trás-os-Montes e Alto Douro Águas de Trás-os-Montes e Alto Douro, SA 2001 30 418,4
Environment Águas do Algarve Águas do Algarve, SA 2001 30 457,3
Environment Águas do Ave Águas do Ave, SA 2003 33 376,0
Environment Águas do Centro Águas do Centro, SA 2001 30 177,0
Environment Águas do Minho e Lima Águas do Minho e Lima, SA 2000 30 164,8
Environment Águas do Mondego Águas do Mondego, SA 2004 35 232,0
Environment Águas do Norte de Alentejano Águas do Norte de Alentejano, SA 2001 30 93,8
Environment Águas do Zézere e Côa Águas do Zézere e Côa, SA 2000 30 286,0
Environment Algar Algar, SA 1996 25 60,7
Environment Amarsul Amarsul, SA 1997 25 70,1
Environment Ersuc Ersuc, SA 1997 25 87,7
Environment Resinorte Resinorte - valorização e trat. resíduos sólidos, SA 2009 30 190,8
Environment Resiestrela Resiestrela, SA 2008 30 34,1
Environment Resioeste Resioeste, SA 1998 25 37,0
Environment Resulima Resulima, SA 1996 25 31,6
Environment Suldouro Suldouro, SA 1996 25 52,9
Environment Valnor Valnor, SA 2001 29 24,8
Environment Valorlis Valorlis, SA 1996 25 31,0
Environment Valorminho Valorminho, SA 1996 25 14,1
Environment Valorsul Valorsul, SA 1995 25 291,5
Environment Sanest Sanest, SA 1995 25 201,6
Environment Simarsul Simarsul, SA 2004 30 235,9
Environment Simlis Simlis, SA 2000 30 75,0
Environment Simria Simria, SA 2000 30 313,7
Environment Simtejo Simtejo, SA 2001 30 536,3
Environment Simdouro Simdouro - Saneamento do Grande Porto, S. A 2009 50 72,0
Water Barragem de Foz Tua EDP 2008 75 340,0
Water Barragens de Gouvães, Padreselos, Alto Tâmega, Daivões IBERDROLA 2008 65 1.700,0
Water Barragens do Fridão e Alvito EDP 2008 65 510,0
Water Barragem Baixo Sabor EDP 2008 65 257,0
Water Barragem Girabolhos ENDESA 2008 65 360,0
Water Barragem do Alqueva EDP 2008 35 339,0  
 
 





Sector Concession Dealer Year Deadline Investment
Energy Armaz. Subterrâneo de Gás Natural (Guarda) Transgás Armazenagem, SA 2006 40 29,3
Energy Distribuição Regional de Gás Natural (Lisboa) Lisboagás GDL Soc. Dist. Gás Natural de Lisboa, SA 2008 40 578,0
Energy Distribuição Regional de Gás Natural (Centro) Lusitaniagás - Comp. Gás do Centro, SA 2008 40 289,3
Energy Distribuição Regional de Gás Natural (Setúbal) Setgás -  Soc. Prod. Distrib. Gás, SA 2008 40 159,8
Energy Distribuição Regional de Gás Natural (Porto) Portgás - Soc. Prod. Distrib. Gás, SA 2008 40 307,4
Energy Armaz. Regasificação de Gás Natural (Sines) REN Atlântico, SA 2006 40 212,0
Energy Armaz. Subterrâneo Gás Natural (Guarda, Pombal) REN Armazenagem, SA 2006 40 114,9
Energy Distribuição Regional de Gás Natural (Beiras) Beiragás- Companhia Gás das Beiras, SA 2008 40 69,2
Energy Distribuição Regional de Gás Natural (Vale do Tejo) Tagusgás -  Empresa Gás Vale do Tejo, SA 2008 40 66,5
Energy Gestão Rede Nacional Transporte de Gás Natural REN Gasodutos, SA 2006 40 753,0
Energy Rede Eléctrica Nacional REN-Rede Eléctrica Nacional, SA 2007 50 1.291,7
Energy Exploração da Rede Nac. Distribuição de elect. EDP-Distribuição Energia, SA 2006 35 1.808,3
Security SIRESP SIRESP - Redes digitais de Seg. e Emergência 2002 20 112,0
Port SIRESP Terminal de Contentores de Leixões SA 2000 25 68,6
Port Terminal de Carga a Granel de Leixões Terminal de Carga Geral e de Graneis de Leixões SA 2001 25 42,8
Port Silos de Leixões Silos de Leixões, unipessoal Lda 2007 25 6,2
Port Terminal Produtos Petrolíferos Petrogal, SA 2006 25 n.d.
Port Terminal de Granéis Líquido Alimentares E.D. & F. Man Portugal Lda 2001 15 n.d.
Port Terminal Expedição de Cimento a Granel SECIL - Comp. Geral de Cal e Cimento, SA 2001 15 n.d.
Port Serviço de Descarga, Venda e Expedição de Pescado Docapesca - Portos e Lotas SA 1995 25 n.d.
Port Instalações de Apoio à Navegação de Recreio Marina de Leixões - Associação de Clubes 1985 25 n.d.
Port Exploração Turística-Hoteleira Dourocais - Inv. Imobiliários SA 2001 20 n.d.
Port Exploração Restaurante e Bar Companhia de Cervejas Portuárias, SA 2000 20 n.d.
Port Terminal Sul Aveiro Socarpor   - Soc. De Cargas Portuárias (aveiro), SA 2001 25 6,3
Port Serviço de Reboque Aveiro Tinita - Transportes e Reboques Marítimos, SA 2004 10 2,8
Port Terminal de Contentores de Alcântara Liscont - Operadores de Contentores SA 1985 57 362,2
Port Terminal de Contentores de Santa Apolónia Sotagus - Terminal de Contentores de Santa Apolónia, SA 2001 20 60,8
Port Terminal Multipurpose de Lisboa Transinsular, Transportes Marítimos Insulares, SA 1995 15 n.p.
Port Terminal Multiusos do Beato TMB - Terminal Multiusos do Beato Op. Portuárias, SA 2000 20 7,3
Port Terminal Multiusos do Poço do Bispo Empresa de Tráfego e Estiva, SA 2000 20 3,3
Port Terminal de Granéis Alimentares da Trafaria SILOPOR - Empresa de Silos Portuários, SA 1995 30 n.p.
Port Terminal de Granéis Alimentares da Beato SILOPOR - Empresa de Silos Portuários, SA 1995 30 n.p.
Port Terminal de Granéis Alimentares de Palença Sovena Oilseeds Portugal, S.A. 1995 30 n.p.
Port Terminal do Barreiro ATLANPORT - Sociedade de Exploração Portuária, SA 1995 30 n.p.
Port Terminal de Granéis Líquidos do Barreiro LBC - TANQUIPOR, S.A. 1995 30 n.p.
Port Terminal do Seixal - Baia do Tejo Baía do Tejo,S.A. 1995 30 n.p.
Port Terminal Multiusos Zona 1 Tersado - Terminais Portuários do Sado, SA 2004 20 11,9
Port Terminal Multiusos Zona 2 Sadoport - Terminal Marítimo do Sado, SA 2004 20 13,7
Port Terminal de Granéis Sólidos De Setúbal Sapec - Terminais Portuários, SA 1995 25 6,0
Port Terminal de Granéis Liq. De Setúbal Sapec - Terminais Portuários, SA 2003 25 3,7
Port Terminal Contentores de Sines XXI PSA Sines - Terminal de Contentores, SA 1999 30 336,5
Port Terminal Multipurpose de Sines Portsines - Terminal Multipurpose de Sines, SA 1992 25 103,6
Port Terminal de Petroleiro e Petroquímico Petróleos de Portugal - Petrogal, SA 2003 10 n.d.
Port Serviço de Reboque e Amarração Sines Reboport-Soc.Portuguesa Reboques Marítimos, SA 2002 20 n.d.
Port Terminal de Granéis Liq. e Gestão de Resíduos CLT - Companhia Logística de Terminais Marítimos, SA 2008 30 n.d.  
 














4.2)  Discount rates 
 
In our tests we will use three discount rates.  
 
First, we will use the legal discount rate defined by the Bank of Portugal of 6%. This rate was 
applied in Portugal since a 2003 government decision (Led by the Minister of Finance – 
Manuela Dias Ferreira Leite) to evaluate all projects with a 4% real discount rate and a 2% 
inflation rate (“Despacho nº13 208/2003). 
 
Second, we will use the yield of Portugal long-term debt and we will use the discount rate that 
calculates the present value of the future payments (30 years) of the Portuguese debt, and we 
will assume 2008 prices. According to our calculations, the average yield was 4,8%. 
Although this is a lower interest rate that the private sector would have, we will consider that 
this is an appropriated discount rate, once it represents the opportunity cost for public sector to 
make this investments in the budget and not, “off-balance sheet”. If this investment would 
considered in the budget of the construction years, it would have increased the deficit and 
therefore, would also increase the need to raise public debt which pays on average a rate similar 
to the one used in this study. In fact, the interest rate of new public debt tends to follow the 
interest rate of treasury bonds of the same maturity in the secondary market. 
 
And thirdly, we will use the Rate of Social Time Preference set on 5,5% for Cohesion countries 
(EU Benchmark), according to Kabarakis (2008), in the Cost-Benefit Analysis of investment 



















In our tests we will be using the annual payments (cash flow payments) of PPP’s referring to the 
State Budget of 2008.  
 
Although more recent data is available (mainly the 2009 and 2010 payments are available both 
in the Budget Report, and in the Treasury PPP year report), we decided to consider the 2008 
data, because: 
 
1. In 2009, payments have started to consider the positive cash-flow after 2029 on the 
Brisa highway concession that will end by that time. As Brisa is a concession and not a 
Public Private Partnerships, the positive cash-flows after the end of the concession 
should not be included in the estimation of Public Private Partnership’s net present 
value. The presence of this data would completely change this analysis. In fact, in the 
report of the 2011 Budget, the Parliament Technical Budget Unit (UTAO, 2010), has 
calculated that at constant prices and considering the new data, the net present value 
would be positive in 20 billion. The Unit have also considered that this value is very 
much related to traffic estimation for the year beyond 2030, to make it a more realistic. 
 
2. The 2009 and 2010 data is available at constant prices (Orçamento do Estado, 2010), 
but no information on what is the year base and what was the deflator is available, 
making it difficult to analyze. Even assuming that they are discounted at the average 
inflation of 2%, this is a very low rate comparing with the interest rates that the 
Portuguese Republic is actually paying to finance it. Until 2008 prices are in a current 









Table 3 - Annual payments to the public-private partnerships 
Year Roads with toll Roadas without toll Concessions Subtotal MST Fertagus RAV subtotal
2008 -185.8 667.4 - 481.6 24.4 11.6 0.0 36.0 11.7 31.0 560.3
2009 57.9 647.8 -240.3 465.4 66.3 11.0 0.0 77.3 138.8 41.0 722.5
2010 26.2 714.6 -2.6 738.2 0.0 9.7 200.0 209.7 235.5 44.3 1227.7
2011 14.6 748.5 -20.7 742.4 0.0 0.0 250.0 250.0 253.0 48.0 1293.4
2012 6.8 739.6 -241.6 504.8 0.0 0.0 300.0 300.0 635.1 42.4 1482.3
2013 6.2 702.8 -240.5 468.5 0.0 0.0 311.3 311.3 529.8 42.4 1352.0
2014 5.7 741.4 376.7 1123.8 0.0 0.0 562.6 562.6 543.9 42.4 2272.7
2015 5.2 738.1 481.9 1225.2 0.0 0.0 529.3 529.3 563.1 42.4 2360.0
2016 4.7 736.1 481.3 1222.1 0.0 0.0 535.5 535.5 584.7 42.4 2384.7
2017 4.2 730.2 486.8 1221.2 - - 477.1 477.1 607.6 42.4 2348.3
2018 3.7 761.4 495.3 1260.4 - - 459.8 459.8 631.0 42.4 2393.6
2019 3.1 686.4 494.4 1183.9 - - 444.6 444.6 456.1 42.4 2127.0
2020 -9.2 723.3 491.1 1205.2 - - 437.9 437.9 267.9 42.4 1953.4
2021 -9.9 716.1 489.8 1196.0 - - 430.6 430.6 263.7 42.4 1932.7
2022 -10.6 703.0 490.6 1183.0 - - 423.0 423.0 145.0 0.0 1751.0
2023 -11.2 708.8 485.0 1182.6 - - 414.9 414.9 146.8 0.0 1744.3
2024 -11.6 699.5 489.0 1176.9 - - 406.2 406.2 148.6 0.0 1731.7
2025 -12.2 585.3 491.6 1064.7 - - 396.9 396.9 150.4 0.0 1612.0
2026 -12.9 538.5 489.2 1014.8 - - 387.0 387.0 152.2 0.0 1554.0
2027 -13.5 449.7 496.9 933.1 - - 377.5 377.5 154.1 0.0 1464.7
2028 -14.1 417.8 495.1 898.8 - - 397.8 397.8 156.0 0.0 1452.6
2029 -14.7 397.2 491.4 873.9 - - 362.9 362.9 158.0 0.0 1394.8
2030 -8.9 246.2 494.6 731.9 - - 408.3 408.3 160.0 0.0 1300.2
2031 -3.9 164.2 486.7 647.0 - - 352.7 352.7 162.1 0.0 1161.8
2032 -4.0 6.3 477.9 480.2 - - 352.1 352.1 164.2 0.0 996.5
2033 -4.2 0.0 482.1 477.9 - - 331.3 331.3 166.3 0.0 975.5
2034 -69.4 0.0 482.3 412.9 - - 345.6 345.6 168.5 0.0 927.0
2035 -61.8 0.0 484.1 422.3 - - 333.7 333.7 170.7 0.0 926.7
2036 -72.7 0.0 485.3 412.6 - - 321.1 321.1 172.9 0.0 906.6
2037 0.0 0.0 490.2 490.2 - - 307.9 307.9 175.3 0.0 973.4
2038 0.0 0.0 433.9 433.9 - - 293.9 293.9 168.7 0.0 896.5
2039 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - 279.3 279.3 137.3 0.0 416.6
2040 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - 263.9 263.9 0.0 0.0 263.9
2041 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - 247.6 247.6 0.0 0.0 247.6
2042 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - 230.6 230.6 0.0 0.0 230.6
2043 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - 222.9 222.9 0.0 0.0 222.9
2044 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - 188.9 188.9 0.0 0.0 188.9
2045 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - 188.4 188.4 0.0 0.0 188.4
2046 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - 138.8 138.8 0.0 0.0 138.8
2047 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - 115.0 115.0 0.0 0.0 115.0
2048 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - 92.8 92.8 0.0 0.0 92.8
2049 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - 69.5 69.5 0.0 0.0 69.5
2050 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - -80.0 -80.0 0.0 0.0 -80.0
Roads sector
PPP in health Others Total
Train sector
  
Source: DGTF (2009) 
 








When analyzing exhibit 4 and 5 we can verify that a small change of the discount rate (∆1,2%), 
in the road sector accounts for differences of 1.753,6M Euros, considering the total Public 
Private Partnerships projects in exhibit 7 we can calculate differences of 3.241,2M Euros. 
 
Roads with toll represent a negative NPV (-176,2M Euros up to -152,9M Euros), it means that 
Government has an income because of the tolls that drivers have to pay by using these roads. 
  
Exhibit 4 shows us that Public Private Partnerships in the Road sector represent 7.1% - 8.1% as 
% of Portugal’s GDP of 2008, where roads without tool represent the largest portion.  
 
In Exhibit 5 we can verify that the Train Sector represents 5,058.4M Euros up to 5,964.5M 
Euros, it is the second sector that has biggest costs relatively to Public payments for Public 
Private Partnerships. Health Sector represents 4,333.2M Euros up to 4,883.6M Euros being the 
third sector that has biggest payment costs.  
 
Exhibit 6 shows NPV as a % of the GDP where Public Private Partnerships is on average 13,6% 
of the Total amount of GDP and when analyzing this 13,6% we can verify that 35,7% of it 
refers to roads without toll.  
 
Table 4 –NPV of Portuguese PPP in the Road Sector 
 
Legal discount rate




Roads with toll -152.9 -0.1% -176.2 -0.1% -161.7 -0.1%
Roads without toll 8,339.8 4.9% 9,258.1 5.4% 8,704.7 5.1%
Concessions 3,960.7 2.3% 4,819.3 2.8% 4,295.1 2.5%
Subtotal for PPP on Roads 12,147.6 7.1% 13,901.2 8.1% 12,838.0 7.5%
PPP NPV
Discount Rates
As % of GDP 
2008
As % of GDP 
2008




Table 5 –NPV of Portuguese PPP in other sectors 
Legal discount rate




Train sector 5,058.4 2.9% 5,964.5 3.5% 5,410.0 3.1%
Health sector 4,333.2 2.5% 4,883.6 2.8% 4,550.6 2.6%
Others 388.1 0.2% 419.3 0.2% 400.7 0.2%
As % of GDP 
2008
As % of GDP 
2008












Table 6 – NPV as % GDP 
PPP NPV as % GDP Legal discount rate
Yeld 10-year bonds 
2008
STPR
Roads with toll -0.1% -0.1% -0.1%
Roads without toll 4.9% 5.4% 5.1%
Concessions 2.3% 2.8% 2.5%
Train sector 2.9% 3.5% 3.1%
Health sector 2.5% 2.8% 2.6%
Others 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%  
 
Table 7 – NPV of Portuguese PPP: All projects analyzed 
 
Legal discount rate




Total PPP projects 21,927.3 12.8% 25,168.5 14.6% 23,199.4 13.5%
As % of GDP 
2008
As % of GDP 
2008






As we look at Figure 1 we can extrapolate that the in the next 10 years, Public Private 
Partnerships have been and will be responsible for most payments in the period 2008-2050.  
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5)  Conclusion 
 
We have developed in this paper some solutions to identify the best discount rates in a Public 
Private Partnership from the Public Sector point of view. We assume that there should be three 
discount rates in order to provide a good scenario basis for analysis. 
We believe that Public Private Partnerships is a solution to provide efficient and better services 
from the Public Sector. We also considered that there should always be a cost / benefit analysis 
before deciding to implement a Public Private Partnerships within any public service. Contracts 
with the private sector have to be reviewed from independent parties to develop different 
assumptions and achieve a win - win negotiation between both sides of the project. This issue is 
critical, because when we take a look at the Portuguese example we conclude that the private 
bidder in the Public Private Partnership has been boosting their incomes, while on the other 
hand, the Public Sector is facing enormous debts. For example, in the road sector there has been 
some controversy concerning the social impact of constructing so many highways, especially in 
the North of Portugal.  
According to our studies we propose that Public Private Partnerships discount rates in 2008 
should be between 4,8% and 6% depending on the economic environmental of the public 
participant, and the sector under focus. 
When analyzing our results, we come to the conclusion that the Portuguese Experience road 
sector holds the biggest impact in Public Private Partnerships (55,3 % of total NPV), where 
roads with and without tolls sharing the most part. 
Before 2009, the Health Sector was a small part of the Portuguese experience, but since then 
there are new projects being developed. We anticipate that in the next years this sector will gain 
more power. 
As we know Portugal is being investigated by the International Monetary Fund mainly because 
of Portugal’s big financial debt and weak economy (recession), putting in risk Portugal’s future 
payments of Public Private Partnerships. 
On 17
th
 May 2011 there was issued a “Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic 
Policy Conditionality” with the regards of the Council Regulation (EU) that established a 
European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM) with the aim of a financial assistance and 
a policy programme to Portugal, regarding Public Private Partnerships it was set that the 
Portuguese Government will: 
- Abstain engagements in new Public Private Partnerships until there is a fully review on the 
existing Public Private Partnerships and legal and institutional reforms proposed; 




- Make an assessment of the 20th most significant Public Private Partnerships, including the 
major “Estradas de Portugal, EC and IMF will perform technical assistance;  
- Recruit a “top tier international” accounting firm to undertake a serious and relentless study of 
Portuguese Public Private Partnerships in consultation with INE and the Ministry of Finance. 
The aim of the review will be indentify and quantify major contingent liabilities and any 
amounts that are related with Government debt.  
- Create a strengthened legal and institutional framework, within the Ministry of Finance, with 
the aim for assessing fiscal risks ex-ante of engaging into a Public Private Partnership. 
- Enhance the annual PPP report prepared by the Ministry of Finance, with a comprehensive 
assessment of the fiscal risks stemming from Public Private Partnerships. With the liaison of 
Bank of Portugal there will be an analysis of credit flows channeled to Public Private 
Partnerships through banks. 
In our studies we thought that there were some limitations surrounding Portugal’s State public 
information, in Portugal the public websites have a lack of organized data and reliable data.  
For future research we recommend that there should be a European Union analysis regarding 
PPP, there should be comparisons between different countries regarding the methodology of the 
PPP’s and what discount rates should be applied in each country.  
We strongly believe that when taking assumptions in a Public Private Partnerships it’s 
absolutely essential to create two or three scenarios because it’s is impossible to guarantee that 
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